Rank-Order Contracts for a Principal with Many Agents
证明，当委托人拥有多个代理人且代理人绩效信息仅委托人知晓时，排序合约仍能保持激励相容，因为总支付与结果无关。在比以往更宽的条件下，排序合约可精确或近似等价于任何非线性计件合约，从而消除信息不对称下计件合约不可执行的问题。
For a principal with many agents, rank-order contracts remain incentive compatible even when information about agents' performance is known only to the principal because the total payment from the principal to all agents taken together is independent of the outcome that occurs. Under wider conditions than those considered previously in the literature, there is shown to exist a rank-order contract equivalent, exactly or approximately, to any (nonlinear) piece-rate contract. Under those conditions, therefore, results that depend on the unenforceability of piece rates under such asymmetric information disappear if rank-order contracts can be used.