Principal—Principal Conflict in the Governance of the Chinese Public Corporation
研究中国上市公司股权集中度与董事会特征的关系，发现股权集中度与董事会薪酬、规模和独立董事比例呈U型关系，表明大股东与中小股东冲突会增加代理成本。
By examining the level of ownership concentration across firms, we determine how principal–principal conflict, defined as the incongruence of ownership goals among shareholder groups in a corporation, impacts agency costs of Chinese boards of directors. Based on data from Chinese companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges during 1999-2003, we found that ownership concentration had a U-shaped relationship with board compensation, board size and the presence of independent directors. These results provide corroborating evidence that principal-principal conflict can lead to high agency costs.