Corporate Governance and Equity Prices: Evidence from the Czech and Slovak Republics
利用捷克和斯洛伐克大规模私有化中的凭证分配和竞价过程，发现所有权越集中，凭证价格和二级市场价格越高，而银行基金持股较多时初始价格较低，暗示利益冲突。
ABSTRACT The Czech and Slovak Republics' mass privatization scheme used voucher points distributed to the population and a competitive bidding process to change the governance of a large number of firms. Voucher prices and following secondary market prices are shown to depend upon the resulting ownership structures. The more concentrated ownership is, the higher prices are. High absolute ownership by a single domestic investor is associated with even higher voucher prices. I find some evidence that initially prices are relatively lower when a bank‐sponsored investment fund has a relatively large stake in a firm. This suggests conflicts of interest.