Right‐to‐Work Laws and Financial Leverage
研究发现美国企业利用高财务杠杆增强与工会的谈判地位，但这种做法集中在没有工作权法的州，且与高市账比和股东-经理利益一致有关。
High leverage can be used to improve a firm's bargaining position with unions. I find that this use of leverage in the United States is concentrated in states without right‐to‐work (RTW) laws. The use of high leverage by unionized firms in these states is associated with high market‐to‐book ratios and is more likely when shareholder and manager interests are aligned through compensation contracts. I confirm these findings by examining the adoption of RTW laws in Oklahoma, as well as presidential and congressional elections. Moreover, I confirm the importance of RTW laws using cash balances instead of leverage.