Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts
研究激励合同中主观与客观绩效衡量的结合使用，发现有效的显性合同可能使所有隐性合同失效，但某些情况下两者互补，单独使用均无利润而组合则能盈利。
Incentive contracts often include important subjective components that mitigate incentive distortions caused by imperfect objective measures. This paper explores the combined use of subjective and objective performance measures in (respectively) implicit and explicit incentive contracts. We show that the presence of sufficiently effective explicit contracts can render all implicit contracts infeasible, even those that would otherwise yield the first-best. We also show, however, that in some circumstances objective and subjective measures are complements: neither an explicit nor an implicit contract alone yields positive profit, but an appropriate combination of the two does. Finally, we consider subjective weights on objective measures.