The Past and Future of Commercial Banking Viewed Through an Incomplete Contract Lens
用不完全契约理论解释商业银行的起源，认为其制度结构（活期存款、按需贷款、监管）旨在提供流动性和安全性；随着信息、法律和产权环境改善，传统银行制度各要素间的协同效应减弱，引发对银行制度特殊性的反思。
Commercial banks emerged at a time when contracts were quite incomplete and property rights insecure. They typically offered demand deposits, made loans on demand, and were regulated. Each of these aspects of the institutional structure were essential in helping the bank provide the twin functions of liquidity and safety. I argue that recent theories of banking, which I collectively refer to as “Incomplete Contract” theories of banking, explain well the origins of banking. I also claim that they can explain recent changes in banking; as th e informational, legal, and property rights environment has improved, there appear to be fewer synergies between various aspects of the traditional institutional structure of the bank. It is now time to think whether there is anything special about the institutional form of the bank, or whether all that is special is that it is regulated.