Achieving Compliance when Legal Sanctions are Non‐deterrent*
实验研究了轻微法律（非威慑性制裁）在公共品供给中的效果，发现外生施加的轻微法律无法实现合规，但内生选择（自我施加）的轻微法律能显著提升合规，因为投票支持轻微法律会引发合作预期。
Abstract Law backed by non‐deterrent sanctions (mild law) has been hypothesized to achieve compliance because of norm activation. We experimentally investigate the effects of mild law in the provision of public goods by comparing it to severe law (deterrent sanctions) and no law. The results show that exogenously imposing mild law does not achieve compliance, but compliance is much improved if mild law is endogenously chosen, i.e., self‐imposed. We show that voting for mild law induces expectations of cooperation, and that people tend to comply with the law if they expect many others to do so.