Sovereign debt, structural adjustment, and conditionality
指出主权债务缺乏有效执行机制导致承诺失败，主权国可能通过减少出口来逃避债务。条件性通过解决承诺失败问题促进债务偿还，但无法达到最优，且可能使国际金融机构和债务国陷入债务悬置持续、债务定期重组的陷阱。
The lack of a proper enforcement mechanism for sovereign debt generates a commitment failure. As a result, a sovereign may seek to improve its position in debt renegotiations and thus evade its debt obligations by reducing exports. Conditionality seeks to provide a solution to the incentive problem by addressing the commitment failure. Formalizing this argument, we show that conditionality helps the repayment of sovereign debt. In certain circumstances, it can eliminate debt overhang, especially when it is coupled with concessionary lending of sufficient magnitude. It is, however, unable to restore first best. When it is anticipated by lenders, conditionality may get international financial institutions and sovereign debtors into a trap where the debt overhang persist, debt rescheduling takes place periodically, and conditionality continues indefinitely.