Externalities and Asymmetric Information
重新审视了在私人信息环境下通过税收调节外部性的庇古理论，发现私人信息可能导致不同代理人共享相同的生产或消费水平，并解释了为何当局更倾向于数量控制而非税收补贴方案。
A reconsideration of the Pigovian theory of regulating externalities via taxation is undertaken for environments with private information. The presence of private information may have no effect on the social optimum; but when it has an impact, it is to cause a group of different agents to share the same production or consumption levels. The model developed provides an appealing characterization of when such situations transpire: they occur when the individuals who desire most to engage in some activity are the ones who society least wants to participate. Since such instances could potentially be regulated by the imposition of quantity controls, this may explain authorities' apparent predilection for quantity limits rather than tax-cum-subsidy schemes to manage many externalities.