Nonexclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons
研究一个卖方私下知道商品质量、买方提供非排他性合约菜单的市场，发现均衡存在且唯一，卖方要么全卖要么不卖，价格为预期质量，为阿克洛夫柠檬市场模型提供了新的战略基础。
Consider a seller who can trade an endowment of a perfectly divisible good, the \nquality of which she privately knows. Buyers compete for this good by o ering menus \nof non-exclusive contracts, so that the seller can privately trade with several buyers. \nIn this setting, we show that an equilibrium exists under mild conditions, and that \naggregate equilibrium allocations are generically unique. Although the good for sale is \ndivisible, in equilibrium the seller ends up trading her whole endowment, or not trading \nat all. Trades take place at a price equal to the expected quality of the good, conditional \non the seller being ready to trade at that price. Our model thus provides a novel \nstrategic foundation for Akerlof's (1970) results. It also contrasts with competitive \nscreening models in which contracts are assumed to be exclusive, as in Rothschild and \nStiglitz (1976). Latent contracts that are issued but not traded in equilibrium play an \nimportant role in our analysis.