Organizational Complexity and Succession Planning
用大样本数据研究人力资本如何影响CEO继任过程，发现组织越复杂的企业越倾向于内部培养接班人，且继任规划能提高内部继任和自愿继任的概率、降低强制继任概率。
Abstract This study uses a large sample of firms to examine how human capital considerations affect the process of CEO succession. Costs and benefits of succession planning are affected by a firm's level of operational complexity and human capital requirements; firms that are more complex incur greater costs to transferring firm-specific knowledge and expertise to an outsider, and should be more likely to groom an internal candidate for the CEO position. Consistent with this, I find that a firm's propensity to groom an internal candidate for the CEO position is related to firm size, degree of diversification, and industry structure. My results also suggest that succession planning is associated with a higher probability of inside succession and voluntary succession and a lower probability of forced succession. I also provide evidence that horizon problems are mitigated to some extent by having a succession plan.