The “Rabassa Morta” in Catalan Viticulture: The Rise and Decline of a Long-Term Sharecropping Contract, 1670s–1920s
研究了加泰罗尼亚地区长期使用的“Rabassa Morta”分成租佃契约，发现它在早期有效减少了道德风险和机会主义行为，但19世纪末因技术变革、工资上涨和酒价下跌导致佃农违约增加，引发冲突和信任丧失。
For long periods, and in line with recent theoretical literature, the rabassa morta sharecropping contract successfully reduced problems of moral hazard and opportunistic behavior, and provided incentives for sharecroppers to respond to market opportunities. However, from the late nineteenth century, technical change, rising wages, and weak wine prices all increased the incentives for postcontractual opportunistic behavior on the part of the sharecropper, leading to conflicts and loss of trust between the principal and agent.