A Note on Feedback Sequential Equilibria in a Lanchester Model with Empirical Application
研究双寡头不对称信息下序贯博弈的动态广告策略，使用兰彻斯特模型和反馈斯塔克尔伯格均衡概念，设计算法求解并基于可乐市场数据比较不同均衡下的广告策略。
We study in this paper dynamic equilibrium advertising strategies in a duopoly with asymmetric information structure and sequential play. The advertising model of Lanchester is used in a game where the relevant solution concept is feedback Stackelberg equilibrium, which is subgame perfect. An algorithm is devised for the computation of this equilibrium, and numerical results are reported and discussed. Using a data set from the cola market, we obtain the resulting advertising strategies and provide a comparison with closed-loop and open-loop Nash equilibria.