Role of Collateral and Personal Guarantees in Relationship Lending: Evidence from Japan's SME Loan Market
研究日本中小企业贷款市场中抵押品和个人担保的使用决定因素，发现企业风险对抵押品使用影响不显著，但主银行对抵押贷款监控更严，长期关系借款人更可能提供抵押品，支持抵押品提升银行优先权并增强筛选监控的理论。
This paper investigates the determinants of the use of collateral and personal guarantees in Japan's SME loan market. We find that firms' riskiness does not have a significant effect on the likelihood that collateral is used. We find, however, that main banks whose claims are collateralized monitor borrowers more intensively and that borrowers who have a long‐term relationship with their main banks are more likely to pledge collateral. These findings are consistent with the theory that the use of collateral is effective in raising the bank's seniority and enhances its screening and monitoring. This incentive effect for the bank becomes tenuous for personal guarantees.