Teacher Quality Policy When Supply Matters
通过模拟教师劳动力市场，研究基于绩效的薪酬和任期政策如何影响教师选拔，发现奖金政策激励有限，降低任期率需大幅加薪，最优政策对市场参数敏感。
Teacher contracts that condition pay and retention on demonstrated performance can improve selection into and out of teaching. I study alternative contracts in a simulated teacher labor market that incorporates dynamic self-selection and Bayesian learning. Bonus policies create only modest incentives and thus have small effects on selection. Reductions in tenure rates can have larger effects, but must be accompanied by substantial salary increases; elimination of tenure confers little additional benefit unless firing rates are extremely high. Benefits of both bonus and tenure policies exceed costs, though optimal policies are sensitive to labor market parameters about which little is known.