A critique of the information asymmetry argument in the management and entrepreneurship underpricing literature
回顾了14篇顶级管理与创业期刊中关于IPO抑价的信息不对称论点，指出其将信号误认为影响信息不对称、且未明确界定不知情投资者，建议拓宽研究视角。
Since the last decade management researchers have actively studied the phenomenon of underpricing in initial public offerings. The information asymmetry argument derived from signaling theory is the most commonly used theoretical framework. This essay reviews how the argument is formulated in 14 prior studies published in leading management and entrepreneurship journals. Two major problems are identified: a signal is erroneously argued to have an effect on information asymmetry and the uninformed investors involved in an information asymmetry situation are either ambiguously specified or misspecified. We suggest broadening the scope of underpricing research to include alternative theoretical perspectives and to consider underpricing as an independent variable.