Median‐voter Equilibria in the Neoclassical Growth Model under Aggregation*
研究了财富异质性下动态中位选民模型，刻画了时间一致的马尔可夫完美均衡，并推导了中位选民的一阶条件，为理解税收再分配的政治经济机制提供分析框架。
Abstract We study a dynamic version of Meltzer and Richard's median‐voter model where agents differ in wealth. Taxes are proportional to income and are redistributed as equal lump‐sum transfers. Voting occurs every period and each consumer votes for the tax that maximizes his welfare. We characterize time‐consistent Markov‐perfect equilibria twofold. First, restricting utility classes, we show that the economy's aggregate state is mean and median wealth. Second, we derive the median‐voter's first‐order condition interpreting it as a tradeoff between distortions and net wealth transfers. Our method for solving the steady state relies on a polynomial expansion around the steady state.