Agency Conflicts and Cash: Estimates from a Dynamic Model
通过估计一个包含三种代理问题的动态模型，发现管理者在职消费是影响企业现金政策的关键因素，而管理者持股比例低是现金持有长期上升趋势的主因。
ABSTRACT Which agency problems affect corporate cash policy? To answer this question, we estimate a dynamic model of finance and investment with three mechanisms that misalign managerial and shareholder incentives: limited managerial ownership of the firm, compensation based on firm size, and managerial perquisite consumption. We find that perquisite consumption critically impacts cash policy. Size‐based compensation also matters, but less. Firms with lower blockholder and institutional ownership have higher managerial perquisite consumption, low managerial ownership is a key factor in the secular upward trend in cash holdings, and agency plays little role in small firms' substantial cash holdings.