Equivalence of Input Quotas and Input Charges under Asymmetric Information in Agri‐environmental Schemes
构建了一个包含逆向选择和道德风险的农业环境计划模型，证明在信息不对称下，投入配额与投入收费机制在减排水平、补偿支付、监控成本和检测概率上等价，且最优合同与农户风险偏好无关。
Abstract A model of adverse selection and moral hazard in agri‐environmental schemes is developed based on the input quota mechanism of Moxey et al. ( Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 50, (1999) pp. 187–202) and Ozanne et al. ( European Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 28, (2001) pp. 329–347), rather than the input charge mechanism of White ( Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 53, (2002) pp. 353–360), but the variable fine of the latter rather than the fixed fine assumed by Ozanne et al. ( European Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 28, (2001) pp. 329–347) is used. Incentive‐compatible contracts, including the optimal probabilities of detection (and, therefore, monitoring frequencies and costs) for more and less efficient farmers, are identified. It is shown that the input charge and input quota approaches lead to identical outcomes – in terms of abatement levels, compensation payments, monitoring costs and probabilities of detection – confirming the equivalence of input quotas and input charges under asymmetric information. It is also shown that the optimal contracts are independent of the risk preferences of farmers with regard to being caught cheating.