Fund Families as Delegated Monitors of Money Managers
基金经理从管理经验中比外界更了解自身能力，导致仅依赖历史收益的合同效率低下。大型基金家族通过内部信息减少这种效率损失，并通过解雇部分经理来增强留任经理的可信度，随着经理数量增加，效率损失趋近于零。
Because a money manager learns more about her skill from her management experience than outsiders can learn from her realized returns, she expects inefficiency in future contracts that condition exclusively on realized returns. A fund family that learns what the manager learns can reduce this inefficiency cost if the family is large enough. The family's incentive is to retain any given manager regardless of her skill but, when the family has enough managers, it adds value by boosting the credibility of its retentions through the firing of others. As the number of managers grows, the efficiency loss goes to zero. Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.