Client Discretion, Switching Costs, and Financial Innovation
分析投资银行开发创新产品的激励，发现市场份额大的银行创新动力更强，小银行倾向于与大银行共享创新；波动环境和监管审查反而鼓励漏洞利用行为，对缺乏知识产权保护的市场（如软件业）有启示。
We analyze the incentives of investment banks to develop innovative products. We show that client characteristics and market structure affect these incentives significantly. Investment banks with larger market shares have greater incentives to innovate and smaller banks are likely to share their innovations with the largest bank. Innovation incentives increase in volatile environments and regulatory scrutiny actually encourages loophole exploitation activity. Our predictions are consistent with stylized facts and the analysis has broad testable implications for innovative activity in other markets similarly characterized by a lack of comprehensive protection for intellectual property rights, for example, the software industry.