Monetary Discretion, Pricing Complementarity, and Dynamic Multiple Equilibria
研究相机抉择的货币政策如何通过私人部门与政策制定者之间的动态互补性产生多重均衡，并在一个两期交错定价的新凯恩斯模型中展示了两种点际均衡和一个随机太阳黑子均衡。
A discretionary policy-maker responds to the state of the economy each period. Private agents' current behavior determines the future state based on expectations of future policy. Discretionary policy thus can lead to dynamic complementarity between private agents and a policy-maker, which in turn can generate multiple equilibria. Working in a simple new Keynesian model with two-period staggered pricing—in which equilibrium is unique under commitment—we illustrate this interaction: if firms expect a high future money supply, (i) they will set a high current price; and (ii) the future monetary authority will accommodate with a higher money supply, so as not to distort relative prices. We show that there are two point-in-time equilibria under discretion, and we construct a related stochastic sunspot equilibrium.