Managerial Turnover and Leverage under a Takeover Threat
研究接管威胁下股东如何解读管理层提高杠杆的行为：提高杠杆可能传递好消息（管理层有能力提升价值），也可能传递坏消息（低效管理层更受压力），模型显示负面更新可能占主导，导致管理层即使承诺提升价值也可能被替换。
How do shareholders perceive managers who lever up under a takeover threat? Increasing leverage conveys good news if it reflects management's ability to enhance value. It conveys bad news, though, if inefficient managers are more pressured to lever up than the efficient ones. This paper demonstrates that negative updating may prevail. Managers who lever up to end a takeover threat may thus commit to enhance value and yet increase their chances of being replaced by their shareholders. The model provides implications for the dispersion of intraindustry leverage and for the stock price reaction to debt‐for‐equity exchanges.