An Incentive Approach to Banking Regulation
研究当监管者比银行更不了解资产风险（逆向选择）且无法监控银行降低资产质量的行为（道德风险）时，如何设计风险调整的存款保险方案，发现最优方案下资产质量低于最优水平，高质量银行资产更大、资本要求更低，且各银行破产概率相等。
ABSTRACT We examine the optimal design of a risk‐adjusted deposit insurance scheme when the regulator has less information than the bank about the inherent risk of the bank's assets (adverse selection), and when the regulator is unable to monitor the extent to which bank resources are being directed away from normal operations toward activities that lower asset quality (moral hazard). Under a socially optimal insurance scheme: (1) asset quality is below the first‐best level, (2) higher‐quality banks have larger asset bases and face lower capital adequacy requirements than lower‐quality banks, and (3) the probability of failure is equated across banks.