Fraternities and Labor-Market Outcomes
研究了学生加入兄弟会的选择与兄弟会录取决策如何影响企业对学生生产率的信号接收，进而决定劳动力市场结果。模型发现均衡中多数成员能力中等，能力强的学生为避免与弱成员关联而不申请。
We model how student choices to rush a fraternity, and fraternity admission choices, interact with signals firms receive about student productivities to determine labor-market outcomes. The fraternity and students value wages and fraternity socializing values. We provide sufficient conditions under which, in equilibrium, most members have intermediate abilities: weak students apply, but are rejected unless they have high socializing values, while most able students do not apply to avoid taint from association with weaker members.