An Agency Theoretic Analysis of the Professionalized Family Firm
运用代理理论框架，分析家族企业与非家族企业在目标、利他倾向和战略时间视野上的差异如何影响对家族与非家族经理人的绩效评估和激励薪酬，以及这些差异如何影响专业化家族企业的相对绩效。
The professionalized firm must evaluate the performance of managers and provide incentives that will motivate them to achieve the firm's goals. Using the agency theoretic framework we develop propositions on how differences in goals, altruistic tendencies, and strategic time horizons might affect performance evaluation and incentive compensation in family firms that employ both family and nonfamily managers and how these differences would affect the performance of the professionalized family firms relative to that of nonfamily firms.