Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship
研究有限次重复的委托代理关系，证明对于任何优于单期纳什均衡的帕累托最优合作安排，当博弈期数足够大时，存在一个近似均衡使双方平均效用接近该合作安排。
The situation in which a principal-agent relationship is repeated finitely many times (T) is formulated as a sequential game.For any Pareto-optimal cooperative arrangement in the one-period game that dominates a one-period Nash equilibrium, and any positive number epsilon, there exists for every sufficiently large T a (noncooperative) epsilon equilibrium of the T-period game that yields each player an average expected utility that is at least his expected utility in the one-period cooperative arrangement, less epsilon.