Setting Efficient Incentives for Agricultural Research: Lessons from Principal‐Agent Theory
运用委托代理理论分析学术研究组织管理，推导科学家最优薪酬方案，探讨如何设计激励以引导研究努力和方向，以及研究组织应集中还是分散。
Abstract A conceptual analysis of important issues in the organization and management of academic research is presented. Principal‐agent theory is applied to derive optimal compensation schemes for scientists when they differ in ability, risk aversion, cost of effort, and reservation utility, and to show the optimal trade‐off between institutional risk and scientists' abilities. Implications for an efficient organization of research are derived, including how scientists' incentives should be structured to elicit optimal research efforts and direction, whether research direction should be centralized or decentralized, and whether the organization of research should be through external competitive grantsor program and institutional funding.