Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
研究在近乎公开的私人监督博弈中，协调后续行动的可能性，发现只有有限回忆行为才能实现协调，否则会导致协调失败。
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have his-tories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public-monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in such games. It is always possible to coordinate continu-ation play by requiring behavior to have bounded recall (i.e., there is a bound L such that in any period, the last L signals are sufficient to determine behavior). We show that, in games with general almost-public private monitoring, this is essentially the only behavior that can coordinate continuation play.