TIME‐INCONSISTENCY AND WELFARE PROGRAM PARTICIPATION: EVIDENCE FROM THE NLSY*
利用NLSY1979年单亲母亲面板数据，估计时间不一致偏好对福利参与决策的影响，并通过反事实实验量化无法承诺未来决策造成的效用损失及承诺机制（如福利时限和工作要求）的潜在收益。
We empirically implement a dynamic structural model of labor supply and welfare program participation for agents with potentially time‐inconsistent preferences. Using panel data on the choices of single women with children from the National Longitudinal Surveys (NLSY) 1979, we provide estimates of the degree of time‐inconsistency, and of its influence on the welfare take‐up decision. With these estimates, we conduct counterfactual experiments to quantify a measure of the utility loss stemming from the inability to commit to future decisions, and the potential gains from commitment mechanisms such as welfare time limits and work requirements.