Monopoly Agenda Control and Asymmetric Information
扩展了Romer-Rosenthal垄断议程控制模型，引入议程设置者独知提案失败结果的信息不对称，分析最优提案策略如何利用信息影响选民决策，并对比完全信息下的均衡行为，得出关于垄断议程选举的实证预测。
This paper extends the Romer-Rosenthal [1978, 1979] model of monopoly agenda control to an environment where only the agenda setter knows with certainty the outcome associated with a failed proposal. The presence of this asymmetric information implies that any "take-it-or-leave-it" proposal may provide information crucial to the decision calculus of the voters, a fact which an optimal proposal strategy will incorporate. The equilibrium behavior of the agenda setter and voters is characterized and contrasted with that in the complete information environment, and a number of empirical predictions concerning the nature of elections with monopoly controlled agendas are derived.