Formal and Real Authority in Organizations
构建了一个理论，分析组织中正式权威与实际权威的分配，指出实际权威由信息结构决定，而信息结构又取决于正式权威的分配。增加下属的实际权威会促进其主动性，但会导致上级失去控制。文章还分析了影响下属实际权威的因素，如任务过载、宽松规则、决策紧迫性、声誉、绩效衡量和上级数量，并指出组织中的沟通量取决于正式权威的分配。
This paper develops a theory of the allocation of formal and real authority within organizations. Real authority is determined by the structure of information, which in turn depends on the allocation of formal authority. An increase in an agent's real authority promotes initiative but results in a loss of control for the principal. The paper analyzes the allocation of formal authority as well as some determinants of the subordinates' real authority: overload, lenient rules, urgency of decision, reputation, performance measurement, and multiplicity of superiors. Finally, the amount of communication in an organization is shown to depend on the allocation of formal authority. Copyright 1997 by the University of Chicago.