DOUBLE‐SIDED ADVERSE SELECTION IN THE PRODUCT MARKET AND THE ROLE OF THE INSURANCE MARKET*
研究了当消费者和企业都存在逆向选择问题时，产品市场与保险市场的相互影响，分析了不同企业提供不同保修合同吸引不同类型消费者的均衡情况。
I investigate the interrelation between a product market and an insurance market when adverse‐selection problems exist both in consumers and in firms. Firms offer warranties for product failures. Consumers may further purchase first‐party insurance for the residual risks of product failures. Given that the insurance market exists, two types of equilibria are possible: (a) Different firm types offer different pooling warranties attracting both good and bad consumer types or (b) good firms attract only bad consumers and bad firms attract both types of consumers. I discuss the existence and the efficiency implication of the insurance market.