Impact of Bayesian Learning and Externalities on Strategic Investment
研究双寡头竞争投资中，企业通过观察先行者表现来学习投资盈利性，同时存在投资外部性，发现学习与外部性的相互作用会导致反直觉的投资时机变化。
We investigate the interplay between learning effects and externalities in the problem of competitive investments with uncertain returns. We examine a game theoretic duopoly investment model in which (i) a firm can learn about the profitability of the investment by observing the performance of the first mover and (ii) externalities exist between the investments of two firms. We find a region of a war of attrition between the two firms in which the interplay between externalities and learning gives rise to counterintuitive effects on investment strategies and payoffs. In particular, we find that, contrary to the conventional war of attrition where an increase in benefits for the follower generally delays the first move, an increase in the rate of learning—which tends to benefit the follower—can hasten the first investment. This paper was accepted by James Smith, decision analysis.