Dynamic markets for lemons: Performance, liquidity, and policy intervention
研究了逆向选择下动态市场的均衡特性，比较了分散与集中市场的流动性及表现，发现分散市场在有限期界下更优，并探讨了补贴低质量或税收高质量对剩余的影响。
Even though adverse selection pervades markets for real goods and financial assets, equilibrium in such markets is not well understood. What are the properties of equilibrium in dynamic markets for lemons? What determines the liquidity of a good? Which market structures perform better, decentralized ones, in which trade is bilateral and prices are negotiated, or centralized ones, in which trade is multilateral and agents are price‐takers? Is there a role for government intervention? We show that when the horizon is finite and frictions are small, decentralized markets are more liquid and perform better than centralized markets. Moreover, the surplus realized is above the static competitive surplus, and decreases as the horizon grows larger, approaching the static competitive surplus as the horizon becomes infinite even if frictions are non‐negligible. Subsidies on low quality or taxes on high quality raise surplus.