State Antitakeover Laws and Voluntary Disclosure
研究了公司注册州的反收购法如何影响自愿披露，发现反收购法越多，公司自愿披露水平和股票市场流动性越高，且两者在阻止收购上存在替代关系。
Abstract We test the relationship between takeover protection and voluntary disclosure in a setting of antitakeover laws in a firm’s state of incorporation. After correcting for the endogeneity of firms’ incorporation choices, we find that firms incorporated in states with more antitakeover laws have higher levels of voluntary disclosure and stock market liquidity. Further tests do not support shareholder demands being the driving force for this association. Our findings are consistent with takeover protection and poor disclosure serving as substitute mechanisms for deterring takeovers. Therefore, as antitakeover statutes mitigate takeover threats, they enhance managers’ incentives to disclose more in order to realize capital market benefits.