Preemptive Bidding and the Role of the Medium of Exchange in Acquisitions
建立模型研究收购中的支付方式选择，指出证券能促使目标管理层做出有效决策，而现金则通过传递高估值信号来先发制人地阻止竞争。
ABSTRACT The medium of exchange in acquisitions is studied in a model where (i) bidders' offers bring forth potential competition and (ii) targets and bidders are asymmetrically informed. In equilibrium, both securities and cash offers are observed. Securities have the advantage of inducing target management to make an efficient accept/reject decision. Cash has the advantage of serving, in equilibrium, to “preempt” competition by signaling a high valuation for the target. Implications concerning the medium of exchange of an offer, the probability of acceptance, the probability of competing bids, expected profits, and the costs of bidders are derived.