Coordination in Oligopoly
研究了寡头垄断中两种行为协调机制的私人与社会效率，发现古诺竞争中企业偏好立即协调至纳什均衡，而伯特兰竞争中企业偏好学习过程，且产量协议可能提高社会福利。
The private and social efficiency of two “behavioral” coordination mechanisms is examined in this paper. In Cournot oligopoly, firms prefer immediate coordination on the Nash equilibrium (interpreted as a preplay communication) over the best‐reply dynamics (and fictitous play) which converge to the equilibrium, but with delay (interpreted as a decentralized learning process). In Bertrand oligopoly, firms prefer the learning process. These results indicate that firms have incentives to create institutions, such as trade associations or informal meetings, to facilitate coordination of production capacities, but not prices. Moreover, quantity agreements may even increase social welfare.