Negative Values in Vickrey Auctions
研究人们在维克里拍卖中对负值商品（如辐照肉）的投标行为，发现第二价格拍卖中投标有偏，而随机第n价格拍卖虽能揭示真实需求但精度较低。
Some people assign negative values for new products sold on laboratory auction blocks\n(i.e., irradiated meat). We explore bidding behavior in two Vickrey auctions when\npeople have positive and negative induced values for the good. Aggregate bidding in the\nsecond-price auction is precise but biased—highest-value positive bidders tend to\noverstate benefits, whereas lowest-negative bidders understate losses. In contrast,\nbidding behavior in the random nth-price auction is demand revealing irrespective of\ninduced value, but it is imprecise. Examining on- and off-margin bidding behavior, we\ncannot conclude that any segments of demand are significantly different than the demand\nrevealing regression line.