Elections, Governments, and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems
提出一个比例代表制议会系统的理论，分析政党无法承诺政策时政府形成的效率与均衡结果，发现共识政府仅在危机时出现，否则政府为最小获胜联盟且政策仅反映执政党偏好。
This paper presents a theory of parliamentary systems with a proportional representation electoral system, a formateur selected based on party representation in parliament, and parties that cannot commit to the policies they will implement once in government. Government formation involves efficient proto-coalition bargaining, and elections yield unique strong Nash equilibrium outcomes. Depending on the status quo, minimal-majority, surplus, or consensus governments can form. If parties and voters are myopic and the status quo is subject to shocks, consensus governments and centrist policies occur only in a crisis. Otherwise, governments are minimal winning, and policies reflect only the preferences of the government parties.