Mandatory IFRS Adoption and the Contractual Usefulness of Accounting Information in Executive Compensation
研究了欧洲大陆强制采用IFRS后，会计信息在高管薪酬契约中的有用性变化，发现薪酬业绩敏感性和相对业绩评价有所增强，尤其在国际会计准则与本地准则差异大的国家。
ABSTRACT We examine how the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in continental Europe affects the contractual usefulness of accounting information in executive compensation, as reflected in pay‐performance sensitivity (PPS) and relative performance evaluation (RPE). The empirical evidence indicates a weak increase in accounting‐based PPS in the post‐adoption period, primarily driven by countries with large differences between IFRS and their previously adopted local accounting standards. We also document a significant increase in accounting‐based RPE using foreign peers after the adoption. Additional analysis shows that the increase in RPE is greater for firms with more foreign sales, and for those with lower availability of domestic peers of comparable size. The overall results are consistent with the compensation committees in those countries perceiving earnings after IFRS adoption to be of higher quality and comparability. Our paper highlights an important benefit of IFRS largely ignored by the literature, that is, the higher earnings quality and comparability brought by the adoption of IFRS facilitate executive compensation contracting.