PRICE‐LEVEL TARGETING AND STABILISATION POLICY: A SURVEY
综述了价格水平目标作为稳定政策工具的利弊，分析其如何通过影响通胀预期改变产出与通胀波动的短期权衡，并指出完全理性预期对最优性的重要性及时间不一致问题的加剧。
Abstract This paper surveys recent articles on the costs and benefits of price‐level targeting, focusing its use as a tool for stabilisation policy. It discusses how price‐level targeting can affect the short‐run trade‐off between output and inflation variability by influencing inflation expectations. It reviews how assigning an explicit price‐level target to a central bank that is unable to commit to its future policies can improve economic performance. It surveys other potential benefits and costs. Among the costs, it underlines the importance of perfectly rational expectations for the optimality of price‐level targeting, and an exacerbation of the time inconsistency problem.