Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
提出一种分析拍卖收益和效率的方法，考虑投标人同时有支付意愿和支付能力的私人信息。研究发现，在绝对支出限制下，第一价格拍卖比第二价格拍卖产生更高预期收益和社会剩余，且该结论在信贷可用时仍成立。
We develop a methodology for analyzing the revenue and efficiency performance of auctions when buyers have private information about their willingness to pay and ability to pay. We then apply the framework to scenarios involving standard auction mechanisms. In the simplest case, where bidders face absolute spending limits, first-price auctions yield higher expected revenue and social surplus than second-price auctions. The revenue dominance of first-price auctions over second-price auctions carries over to the case where bidders have access to credit. These rankings are explained by differences in the extent to which financial constraints bind in different auction formats.