Bargaining, Bonding, and Partial Ownership
研究下游企业持有上游企业部分股权如何影响投资效率，发现当特定投资和通用投资的收益都不确定时，部分所有权优于照付不议合同，且最优持股比例低于50%。
This article provides a theory of interfirm partial ownership. We consider a setting in which an upstream firm can make two alternative types of investment: either specific investment that only a particular downstream firm can use or general investment that any downstream firm is capable of using. When the benefits from specific and general investments are both stochastic, equity participation by the downstream firm in the upstream firm can lead to more efficient outcomes than take‐or‐pay contracts. The optimal ownership stake of the downstream firm is less than 50 percent under a natural assumption about relative bargaining power.