In the Death Zone: A study of limits in the 1996 Mount Everest disaster
从极限与阈限视角重新解读1996年珠峰灾难，指出灾难根源在于极端条件下的阈限状态，而非管理失误，对拥有阈限团队成员的组织有启示。
This article examines the May 1996 Everest disaster through the lens of limits and liminality to provide an alternative interpretation of the significance of the event as a counterpoint to existing accounts. The Everest disaster is an example of management under the most extreme conditions and also an example of a common managerial mindset that is prevalent in the literature on leadership and strategy that anything can be achieved by organizations with appropriate strategic intent and leadership. Rather than focusing upon how disaster could have been avoided by better management, we trace the roots of the disaster to the impact of liminality in extreme conditions and we consider the implications for organizations with liminal team members, a condition that is becoming more prevalent in contemporary organizations.