供应链中议价能力的来源与后果

Sources and consequences of bargaining power in supply chains

JOURNAL OF OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT · 2006
被引 519
人大 AFT50UTD24ABS 4*

中文导读

研究供应链中议价能力的来源,发现拥有重要或集中控制资源的成员议价能力更强,但强者的权力使用受任务相互依赖类型制约,且强弱成员均能从供应链管理中获益。

Abstract

Abstract Research suggests that collaborative supply chain management (SCM) helps chain members create “a rising tide that lifts all boats.” Yet resource dependence theory suggests that when tides rise, some boats are lifted more than others; members who furnish important resources or resources where control is concentrated have bargaining power. Drawing on Thompson [Thompson, J.D., 1967. Organizations in Action. McGraw‐Hill, New York], we argue that strong firms’ bargaining power use is tempered by the type of coordination different types of task interdependencies demand. We also investigate how both strong and weak members benefit from SCM. Whereas strong members reap most of the direct benefits, weak members can often gain by building switching costs with strong members, leveraging SCM outside the focal chain, and increasing survival chances.

供应链管理资源依赖理论议价能力组织间关系运营管理