“Square Deal” or Raw Deal? Market Compensation for Workplace Disamenities, 1884–1903
检验1884-1903年间劳动力市场是否对失业、工伤和职业病风险提供工资补偿，发现失业风险得到完全补偿，工伤部分补偿，职业病无补偿。
Early twentieth-century social reformers claimed that public insurance was necessary because employers ignored the financial needs of their unemployed, injured, or ill workers. Reformers dismissed the idea that competition in the labor market would boost the wages of workers who faced greater chances of job-related financial distress. This article reports a test of the compensating-wage-difference hypothesis on wage samples of men, women, and children from 1884 to 1903. We found mixed support for the reformers' claims: unemployment risk tended to be fully compensated; accident risk was only partially compensated; and occupational illness went unremunerated.