When Is It Optimal to Delegate: The Theory of Fast-Track Authority
研究美国国会为何通过快速通道授权将贸易政策权力委托给总统，模型发现该授权可防止议员间为保护主义租金进行破坏性竞争，且产业分布对称性越高越可能授权。
With fast-track authority (FTA), the US Congress delegates trade-policy authority to the president by committing not to amend a trade agreement. Why would it cede such power? We suggest an interpretation in which Congress uses FTA to forestall destructive competition between its members for protectionist rents. In our model: (i) FTA is never granted if an industry operates in the majority of districts; (ii) The more symmetric the industrial pattern, the more likely is FTA, since competition for protectionist rents is most punishing when bargaining power is symmetrically distributed; (iii) Widely disparate initial tariffs prevent free trade even with FTA.