Behavioral Equilibrium in Economies with Adverse Selection
提出行为均衡概念，研究玩家忽视他人行动信息内容时的经济环境，发现逆向选择问题在玩家忽视选择时加剧，且信念在均衡中同时受基本面与策略限制。
I propose a new solution concept—behavioral equilibrium—to study environments with players who are naive, in the sense that they fail to account for the informational content of other players' actions. I apply the framework to certain adverse selection settings and show that, contrary to the existing literature, the adverse selection problem is exacerbated when naive players fail to account for selection. More generally, the main distinguishing feature of the framework is that, in equilibrium, beliefs about both fundamentals and strategies are jointly restricted. Consequently, whether a behavioral bias may arise or not is determined endogenously in equilibrium.