Voluntary Agreements with Industries: Participation Incentives with Industry-Wide Targets
研究了在面临排放税威胁时，行业整体自愿减排协议中的企业参与激励，发现尽管存在搭便车问题，部分企业仍有参与动机，且行业整体偏好该协议。
We consider a policy environment in which an entire industry is faced with possible imposition of an emissions tax if environmental goals are not met voluntarily. We develop a multiple-firm model of pollution abatement in this context. Using the concept of a self-enforcing equilibrium, we examine the free-riding incentive of individual firms and its impact on the viability of the voluntary approach. We find that, despite the free-riding problem, a sub-group of firms have an incentive to participate in the VA. The VA is strictly preferred by the industry as a whole, although it is not cost-minimizing. <i></i>